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INTRODUCTION. 
During the 1992 general election analysts took great interest in scrutinising the 
work of once largely neglected party strategists.  On one occasion a routine ITN 
lunchtime news item featuring presenter John Suchet and experienced 
Westminster based journalists Julia Langdon and Michael White ended a 
discussion on the now imminent campaign alluding to the supposed ability of the 
‘marketing men’ to dictate the likely course of events.  By no means an isolated 
event, such interchanges help highlight the way in which some of the most 
informed political commentators now view the modern electoral process.  
Nevertheless this view is not necessarily shared by the candidates, at least in 
public.  Dennis Kavanagh has noted that leading politicians are often loathe to 
admit the important strategic role that marketing plays less it detracts from their 
own status or else upsets influential elements in the party[1].  For these and other 
reasons the history of political marketing in Britain cannot necessarily be found in 
official party sources. 
 
 
EVOLUTIONARY MODELS OF MARKETING. 
In their important analysis of the increasingly prominent role given to 
management theory and practice in the work of non-profit making organisations, 
Crompton and Lamb argue:  ‘Marketing is about two things.  First, it is a 
philosophy, an attitude and a perspective.  Second, it is a set of activities used to 
implement that philosophy’[2].  This dichotomy is particularly useful when 
analysing the strategic development of a political party, itself an idiosyncratic 
form of non-profit organisation.  Conceiving marketing as both a set of tools as 
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well as a guiding philosophy helps identify the key historical stages in the 
evolution of electioneering, an activity which forms the principal manifestation of 
this management process within the political sphere.  This also makes it easier to 
understand how alterations in campaign practices can be motivated by factors 
other than environmental criteria such as the impact of mass media and 
technological innovation.  Rather, by placing greater emphasis on parties’ own 
strategic change, it is possible to compare the development of electioneering with 
that of a business marketing programme. 
 
The peculiarly historical focus of this paper differentiates it from earlier work on 
electoral marketing undertaken by both management and political scientists.  
Some of this material has concentrated on establishing the feasibility of applying 
marketing critieria to political analysis[3, 4, 5, 6, 7].  Others, mainly from a 
political science perspective, assume the parallel exists and have proceeded to 
consider the similarities and differences between strategies used by rival parties in 
both domestic[1, 8, 9] and international settings[10, 11, 12].  Analysis of the way 
in which electoral strategies have evolved over time can be found in the literature 
examining party organisational change.   
 
Since Duverger[13] identified the emergence of the mass party machine in Europe 
during the early part of the 20th Century, other commentators have predicted its 
gradual erosion and replacement with a more presidential type of organisation[14, 
15, 16, 17].  Implicit in this work is the view that marketing, or what is more 
commonly labelled ‘professionalism’, is an important catalyst for party change.  
Many commentators regard the 1980s as the decade in which the revolution in 
campaigning took place[11].  Hitherto, however, little consideration has been paid 
to understanding how what might be broadly interpreted as marketing activities 
and thinking have informed party development from the advent of mass 
democracy at the beginning of this century.   
 
Several management theorists have used a three phase evolutionary model 
originally devised by Keith[18] to explain the evolution of marketing as a 
commercial philosophy.  Consequently from this viewpoint it becomes clearer 
that the process is concerned with more than the use of tools such as advertising 
and research.  Within this framework the initial stage, the so-called ‘production’ 
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orientation, takes a classical Fordist view of business and assumes the customer 
will, with minimal encouragement, purchase what the firm makes.  With the 
advent of the next phase, the more complex ‘sales-led’ approach, organisations 
begin to invest in market research in order to better target selected consumer 
groups with more refined and often stylistic communications.  The third and most 
sophisticated orientation, the ‘marketing concept’, is based around the organising 
principle that a successful business strategy starts and ends with the buying 
public.  To use the standard Chartered Institute of Marketing definition, their 
subject of interest is: ‘the management process responsible for identifying, 
anticipating and satisfying customer requirements profitably’[19]. 
 
Whilst most historical accounts of political campaigning in Britain have tended to 
focus on the way media and technological developments have effected party 
organisation[20, 21], Smith and Saunders[22] utilise an evolutionary marketing 
model similar to that of Keith[18] to identify key strategic changes.  Similarly 
Avraham Shama has adopted a comparable approach in his analysis of American 
electioneering[23].  It is possible to apply a derivative model of the latter to 
illuminate the major turning points in British campaign history.  The following 
three sections will identify each key phase of strategic development. 
 
In approaching the study of election campaigning in Britain it has become 
apparent that the major parties have been engaged in marketing related activities 
for most of this century.  Few of the officials involved, however, would have 
consciously described their work in this way. It was chiefly during the 1950s that 
party organisers began to develop greater awareness of the possibilities presented 
them by the mass marketing methods being pioneered by commercial agencies at 
the time.  Nevertheless it was only relatively recently, during the leaderships of 
Thatcher and Kinnock, that the term marketing became an acceptable 
organisational concept and even then only amongst the narrow but powerful elites 
within both party hierarchies.   
 
In becoming the strategic norm, marketing first eroded and then effectively 
sidelined the importance of its Burkean critics in the Conservative party and 
socialist opponents on the Labour side.  Today communicators like Tim Bell, the 
Saatchi brothers, Peter Mandelson and others are, in political terms, household 
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names. Unlike most predecessors their work has been widely interpreted and 
recognised as being of great strategic importance.  In trying to put these actors’ 
contribution in historical context it is necessary to consult and reinterpret some of 
the existing material which deals with campaigning, especially official party 
records which tend to be sensitive about the involvement of professional outsiders 
in strategic decision-making processes.  For this reason the history of political 
marketing in Britain has been, until recently, largely overlooked or else shrouded 
in secrecy. 
 
 
THE ERA OF MASS PROPAGANDA. 
Prior to the Second World War, commentators and political organisers regularly 
referred to the business of political communications work as ‘propaganda’.  The 
term, now somewhat antiquated in electoral terms, usefully described a one-
directional communication process in which passive audiences found themselves 
subjected to the sometimes manipulative appeals of political elites.  As an agency 
of persuasion, propaganda can be compared with the production orientation stage 
in the development of conventional marketing, both approaches being primarily 
concerned with accommodating their own organisational needs rather than those 
of their publics.  According to Shama, this lack of concern with voters’ wants 
manifested itself in an electoral strategy(which he describes as the ‘candidate 
orientation’) based around a simple principle: ‘...increased awareness would 
increase voter preference.  The inputs to the promotion campaign to achieve 
increased awareness were designed on the basis of guess and intuition’[23]. 
 
In Britain the development of modern mass propaganda dates from the 
Representation of the People Act passed in 1918.  The Act, a defining moment in 
British history, nearly trebled the electorate to a size of 21 million[24].  Prior to 
then campaigning had largely consisted of canvassing, leafleting and meetings.  
There had been limited innovations such as the use, by individual parliamentary 
candidates, of the Charles Barker agency for election advertising purposes in the 
early 1800s[25].  Later that century Gladstone’s stump oratory during the 
Midlothian campaign of 1880 succeeded in attracting considerable press interest, 
and thereby helped to cement the relationship between media and political 
elite[26].  Interest in the way leaders communicated to people in the emerging 
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‘mass society’ was heightened with the onslaught of the propaganda intensive 
Great War and beginnings of radio broadcasting.  The changing environment 
presented strategists with what leading Labour official Egerton Wake called a 
‘formidable problem in political engineering’[27]: the roots of modern political 
marketing lie in experimentation undertaken by electoral organisers during the 
inter-war years. 
 
Four years after losing the 1906 election the Conservatives moved to embrace a 
propagandist orientation through the employment of their first press officer, Sir 
Malcolm Fraser[28].  A Press Bureau was established in 1911.  More re-
organisation came later with the appointment of J.C.C. Davidson as Party 
Chairman in 1926.  In reforming the Central Office party headquarters, Davidson 
appeared to take heed of one guide popular amongst Conservative agents at the 
time: ‘Winning elections is really a question of salesmanship, little different from 
marketing any branded article’[24].  In 1927 Joseph Ball, a former military 
intelligence officer with MI5, was appointed head of publicity[28].  Together with 
Davidson he revolutionised party propaganda.  The Press Bureau was expanded 
and specialist sub-sections formed to target stories at newspapers, many of whom 
were already pro-Conservative.  During the 1929 election the Conservatives 
became the first party to use an agency, Holford-Bottomley Advertising Services, 
to help them design posters and leaflets later distributed in their millions[29].  The 
agencies S.H. Benson and Press Secretaries Ltd also played a role in the 
campaign[30].  Benson’s, soon to gain reknown for the 'toucan' advertisement 
‘Guinness is Good for You’, faired less well in their first incursion into politics, 
receiving heavy criticism for the ‘Safety First’ campaign slogan.  Despite this 
setback, the Conservatives re-employed the agency in the subsequent general 
elections of 1931 and 1935. 
 
In preparing for the 1929 election, Central Office set-up a candidate training 
centre, the Bonar Law College.  In addition Conservatives could also expect 
coaching prior to speaking in Party Election Broadcasts.  At local level Streatham 
Association organised the first recorded telephone canvass[24].  There is also 
evidence of limited experimentation with direct mailing.  But perhaps the most 
striking campaign innovation came in the shape of film propaganda.  Guided by 
Albert Clavering, Alexander Korda and others, Conservative Central Office 
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purchased a fleet of mobile cinema vans and made, distributed and showed films 
to thousands of voters during the 1929 election[24].  By 1935 the programme had 
been extended, the vehicles’ costs contributing to the most expensive British 
campaign of all time[30]. 
 
The birth of Labour as a mass propagandist organisation was symbolised in the 
decision to set up a publicity department at headquarters in 1917.  Head of the 
new section Herbert Tracey together with National Agent Egerton Wake were put 
in charge of party campaigning.  Lacking in financial resources, Labour found 
compensation in the shape of strategic advice from assorted sympathisers such as 
leading Fabian intellectual Sidney Webb, founder of the London School of 
Economics and joint author of the Labour party constitution.  In 1922 Webb 
developed the thesis that electioneering could be improved by deployment of 
‘stratified electioneering’, a process akin to the market segmentation and targeting 
techniques which later formed the hallmarks of good marketing practice.  Citing 
another famous scholar, he wrote: 
 '...it was an acute remark of H.G. Wells, twenty years ago, that modern 
 Democracy was characteristically grey, not because any one of the units 
 making up the mass was itself grey, but because the mixing of them together 
 produced a dirty and unattractive grey.  He looked forward to a time when we 
 might be able to see Democracy, not as grey but as very highly coloured 
 indeed, the units being all allowed their separate individuality of hue.' 
 
Webb continued: 
 'Now, I should like to see a little variegated colour in electioneering, in 
addition  to the common grey.  Every elector has his own 'colour', if we could only 
 discover it.  He differs in character and circumstances, temperament and 
 vocation, religion and recreation- and in a thousand other ways from his fellow 
 men.  At present we tend to address them all in the same way, with the result of 
 achieving everywhere a certain amount of “misfit”.’[31] 
 
Webb’s analysis is more than a matter of historical record: influential strategists 
including party secretary Arthur Henderson, the most senior official in the 
organisation, were keen for agents to operationalise the concept.  Evidence 
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suggests several did by targeting electoral groups according to their occupation, 
age and lack of strong partisanship[32]. 
 
Many strategists, conscious of what one called the ‘psychology of the electorate’, 
were eager to promote ‘party image’ to use the phrase originally coined by the 
intellectual Graham Wallas in 1908[33].  Symptomatic of this was Labour’s 
decision to formally adopt a logo in 1924. Writing on the value of political 
advertising in the party agents’ journal the same year, strategist Gordon Hosking 
offered theoretical insights later popularised in the non-profit marketing studies 
involving Kotler[34, 35]: 
 ‘Originally advertising was almost entirely of a commercial character, and was 
 defined in many text-books as 'printed salesmanship'; but this definition is no 
 longer adequate, for in recent years a form of advertising which has little to do 
 with the selling of commodities has been developed extensively. For want of 
 better title we shall call it 'Social Advertising', since it is concerned with 
 arousing public interest in undertakings of a social character.’[36] 
 
Despite such insight, advocates of advertising found themselves stalled by poverty 
coupled with the existence of a strong evangelical tradition in the party eschewing 
the use of what were perceived to be manipulative capitalist techniques.  Together 
these factors help explain Labour's decision to abandon plans to use an advertising 
agency for the 1935 campaign and why attempts to develop film propaganda 
proved problematic[29].  It was not until the 1937 local elections that the party, in 
the guise of London region, used agency professionals in their campaign 
preparations.  London Labour leader Herbert Morrison proved to be instrumental 
in this process, persuading sympathetic contacts in public relations and 
advertising to volunteer their services to help what turned out to be a highly 
successful campaign[37]. 
 
 
THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDIA CAMPAIGNING. 
The post-war growth in the television and advertising industries had a profound 
impact on society: writer J.B. Priestley famously termed them conduits of 
‘admass’ culture[38].  Proliferation of these media had a particular impact on 
political communication in Britain, giving rise to a new kind of electoral strategy 
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akin to the ‘selling concept’ stage in the development of conventional marketing.  
Like their counterparts in the commerical sphere, political parties began to 
embrace market research in order to better plan and target potential groups of 
supporters with more sophisticated advertising communications: ‘(Opinion 
polling) studies were conducted concerning the effectiveness of different 
promotion appeals and media in reaching the voters’[23].  Again the primary 
focus, though increasingly conscious of public opinion, remained geared to 
understanding organisational objectives.  In recognition of the processes involved, 
the new approach can be suitably termed ‘media campaigning’. 
 
The origins of the Conservatives shift towards media campaigning lie in their 
massive 1945 defeat by Labour.  In the following two decades leading figures 
Lord Woolton, Lord Poole and R.A. Butler would be instrumental in 
reconstituting their party as a formidable electoral machine.  An early sign of 
Conservative determination to infuse their electioneering with a more media 
conscious feel came with the appointment of leading advertising agency Colman 
Prentis Varley in 1948[39].  It was the beginning of a longstanding and mutually 
profitable relationship.  CPV executives proved to be the inspiration behind 
‘Life's better with the Conservatives- don't let Labour ruin it’, the 1959 campaign 
slogan derived from ‘You've never had it so good’, itself a paraphrase of 
comments made by prime minister Harold Macmillan[40]. 
 
Whilst links between the Conservatives and advertisers were largely in the public 
domain, almost unknown was the decision by Central Office to set up the Public 
Opinion Research Department in 1948[41].  Marking the first attempt by a British 
party to incorporate polling methods into electoral strategy, the PORD is 
additionally significant because it coincided with a major repositioning of the 
Conservatives which ended with the party taking office in 1951 having moved 
towards the electoral ‘centreground’ in recognition of the outgoing Labour 
government's popular public policies[42].  It would be simplistic to view this shift 
solely as a product of survey research but it is noteworthy that R.A. Butler, the 
chief architect of post-war Conservative policy, was a patron of the PORD and 
keen student of public opinion[39].  The service itself monitored polling trends, 
providing key figures in the bureaucracy and parliamentary party with regular 
briefing  reports.  In one of its most ambitious projects, the department 
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commissioned Market and Information Services Ltd. to undertake a largescale 
study of 5,000 electors in 1949.  Entitled ‘The Floating Vote’, the report was 
significant in that it chose to analyse the newspaper readership, occupations, 
recreations, age and sex of uncommitted electors, thereby defining and 
acknowledging the importance of this constituency[41].  Though the PORD was 
disbanded in 1953 and its functions merged with other Central Office 
departments, private polling continued to be commissioned thereafter. 
 
Under direction from a team led by Tony Benn and Woodrow Wyatt Labour 
began to produce sophisticated Party Election Broadcasts for television during the 
1959 campaign[21].  More significant organisational change in favour of the new 
media campaign style came after this election defeat.  One of the catalysts 
appeared in the form of an opinion research study commissioned by a magazine 
sympathetic to then Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell and his supporters on the 
centre-right, so-called ‘revisionist’ wing of the party.  Entitled ‘Must Labour 
Lose?’, the report was interpreted as a call for the party to reshape its image in 
order to win support from a burgeoning middle-class[43].  Whilst many rejected 
the research findings, the fact that polling analysis managed to provoke a major 
debate provided support for those, notably Tony Crosland, committed to 
integrating these methods into the formulation of promotional campaigns[44].  
Subsequently market researcher Dr Mark Abrams, co-author of Must Labour 
Lose?, became an integral member of Labour's strategic team in the successful 
general election campaign of 1964.  Labour continued to use polling, contracting 
the services of the MORI company throughout the 1970s. 
The period 1962 to 1964 was one of tremendous strategic change.  After the 
untimely death of Hugh Gaitskell, Harold Wilson was elected to the leadership.  
The appointment of Len Williams and John Harris to the key posts of General 
Secretary and Director of Publicity helped further revitalise the party machinery 
culminating in the embrace of media campaigning[39].  Wilson proved to be an 
inspirational strategist, becoming pivotal in building links between his party and a 
group of sympathetic advertising and public relations professionals convened by 
David Kingsley, a London based executive, in preparation for the successful 1964 
general election.  Throughout his leadership Wilson maintained close links with 
professional advisers: on his retirement in 1976 the party was left in something of 
a strategic vacuum. 
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THE ADVENT OF POLITICAL MARKETING. 
Over the past decade it is possible to discern a trend towards the reporting and 
analysis of what is termed ‘political marketing’.  Interest in this phenomenom 
reflects the belief that electioneering in Britain has undergone a major 
transformation in recent times.  This change can be seen to mirror the 
development of a marketing orientation in commerical terms.  Unlike sales-led, 
media campaigning in which organisers are ‘simply called to investigate voters’ 
opinions’, modern political marketing requires a more comprehensive, holistic 
approach to electoral strategy, one which: ‘calls for research which goes far 
deeper than this.  The new marketing concept is interested in the basic political 
needs and wants of the voters’[23].  Put simply opinion research, as representative 
of the electorate, begins to take on an important policy perspective in addition to 
its existing presentational role. 
 
Margaret Thatcher's leadership proved to be a watershed in the development of 
political marketing in Britain.  Elected Conservative leader in 1975, Thatcher set 
out to rejuvenate a party demoralised by defeat in the two general elections of 
1974.  Within four years a revitalised organisation had established a close 
working relationship with advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi.  At the heart of 
this arrangement lay a partnership between party communications director Gordon 
Reece, Saatchi executive Tim Bell and the leader herself.  The trio provided the 
inspiration behind the implementation of a series of campaign initiatives, most 
famously the ‘Labour Isn't Working’ poster, aimed at further undermining public 
confidence in a Labour administration already besieged by problems.  In her 
analysis of Conservative organisation during this period, Margaret Scammell 
contends the party was undergoing a major re-orientation: 
 ‘Most importantly there is evidence that the marketing concept shaped the 
 manifesto and electoral strategy in all three elections under Lady Thatcher's 
 leadership.  This is not to say that market research dictated the details of policy 
 but it did suggest the tone and tenor and indicate that certain policy options 
 were electorally out of  bounds.’[9] 
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The ability of the Thatcher leadership to transform Conservative strategy is partly 
explained by the nature of the party's internal structures.  Because the Party 
Chairman, that is the chief bureaucrat, is an appointee of the leader the party 
organisation tends to operate on a hierarchical basis.  Consequently on taking 
charge, Thatcher fundamentally restructured Central Office even though she was 
unable to initiate similar immediate surgery on her parliamentary frontbench 
team.  Given Conservative leaders also draw up the party manifesto, keen polling 
analyst Thatcher was well placed to begin using the marketing concept to aid with 
policy development.  Such a reading of recent history sits awkwardly with the 
popular perception of Thatcher as an ideologue led by conviction.  However, as 
Scammell demonstrates, the new electoral approach understood the importance of 
the political environment and force of public opinion.  Consequently the 
Conservatives exploited latent populist concerns over crime and immigration, 
tying them to more orthodox policy appeals such as the commitment to allow 
council house tenants the opportunity to buy their homes[9]. 
 
Following their emphatic 1979 victory the Conservatives continued to reorganise 
their campaign machinery.  In 1981 Central Office employed Christopher Lawson 
to head a new marketing department.  Lawson, a former executive of sweet 
manufacturer Mars, committed himself to distilling the party message into a few 
readily understandable appeals[45].  Research proved invaluable.  Particularly 
important were polling findings indicating that though there was serious public 
concern over rising unemployment, most voters blamed the world recession not 
the government[9].  In 1983 the Conservatives secured re-election by an increased 
margin. 
 
Though the general election of 1987 resulted in a third consecutive victory, 
campaign management became the focus of heated debate within leadership 
circles.  Essentially the row revolved around the role of the prime minister.  
Fearing she was becoming increasingly unpopular, some advisors cautioned 
against leader-centred campaigning.  Aggrieved by this view, Thatcher took 
comfort from other strategists’ belief in her value as an electoral asset.  During the 
campaign itself these tensions exploded when, a week before voting, a rogue poll 
indicating Labour was gaining support ignited a furious row between the rival 
Central Office strategists on what became known as ‘Wobbly Thursday’[46].  
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Arguably these events, coupled with the dramatic Conservative leadership 
elections held in 1990 and 1995, reflect the power as well as the vulnerability of 
an office holder who is expected to deliver as both party chief and prime minister. 
 
If the Labour electoral machine was ineffectual during the 1979 election it had 
virtually disintegrated by 1983 in a campaigning effort MP Austin Mitchell 
compared with the infamous marketing launch of the Ford Edsel[47].  This 
devastating defeat effectively marked the end to a long-running civil war in the 
party which had prevented the development of a coherent political programme 
and seen part of the Labour right-wing split off to form the rival Social 
Democratic Party in 1981.  Following the 1983 debacle Labour elected Neil 
Kinnock as leader.  Because of a party structure which made the leadership 
formally accountable to an Annual Conference and its National Executive 
Committee, Kinnock’s intention to reform Labour policy and organisation were 
always likely to face more formidable internal opposition than those piloted by 
Conservative counterpart Margaret Thatcher.  Though initially fraught with 
problems, Kinnock’s eventual success in operationalising the political marketing 
concept helped transform party campaigning and, arguably of greater importance, 
shifted the balance of power in favour of his leadership. 
 
Streamlining of Labour headquarters in 1985 resulted in the appointment of two 
officials who became central to Kinnock’s process of reform; these were General 
Secretary Larry Whitty and Director of Campaigns and Communications Peter 
Mandelson.  The following year saw the launch of the Shadow Communications 
Agency(SCA), a voluntary network of sympathisers working in marketing and 
advertising[48].  Though they did not prevent the subsequent 1987 defeat, the 
SCA helped provide creative inspiration and rejuvenate campaign organisation.  
Some have concluded the election marked Labour's adoption of marketing but, as 
Nicholas O' Shaughnessy points out, it was perhaps more an object lesson in 
advertising[49].  Arguably events after the campaign proved to be of greater 
significance. 
 
In strategic terms Labour embraced a marketing orientation during the Policy 
Review launched after the 1987 defeat.  The initial stage of the Review involved 
the presentation of specially commissioned opinion research entitled 'Labour and 
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Britain in the 1990s' to a meeting of senior leadership figures.  The report 
concluded by arguing that Labour ought to radically change direction in order to 
win uncommitted voters alienated by what was perceived to be the party's 
outdated image[48].  Ultimately the Review enabled the leadership to effectively 
reposition itself nearer the electoral centreground, leading one analyst to 
conclude: 
 ‘Neil Kinnock is certainly to be congratulated for being the first Labour leader 
 to introduce marketing disciplines into his party's ideas and presentation’[50]. 
 
Arguably a legacy of the Review, and the shift to a marketing orientation, has 
been borne out in the party's collective decision to elect the apparently 'voter 
friendly' Tony Blair as leader and the subsequent support given him in his 
successful attempt to re-write Clause Four, Labour's 75 year old mission 
statement. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS. 
Rather than viewing the historical transformation of campaigning in Britain as 
primarily the result of media or technological innovation it is useful to see the 
process as one of strategic change comparable to the development of a company 
engaged in conventional business activities.  Like the plan of a commercial firm, 
the organisation of party campaigning can be seen to evolve greater sophistication 
through three stages, namely the so-called ‘production’, ‘selling’, and ‘marketing’ 
orientations.  In electoral terms these are the equivalent of what have been termed 
here the ‘propaganda’, ‘media’ and ‘political marketing’ approaches to 
electioneering. With reference to the Conservatives, this three part sequence of 
strategic change can be traced through the implementation of initiatives launched 
following the party’s most serious electoral setbacks in 1906, 1945 and 1974.  
Similarly Labour developed as a mass propagandist party in response to the 
expansion of the franchise in 1918, moved towards a media orientation after 
losing in 1959, and more recently has embraced a political marketing approach 
after the 1987 defeat. 
 
The two main parties of government in Britain have long been engaged in 
marketing related activities.  The business of political image making and public 
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relations has a longer heritage in this country than is commonly supposed.  As 
leading advertising executive Winston Fletcher notes: 
 ‘So far from political advertisers copying baked beans and detergents, as the 
 oft-repeated cliche has it, baked beans and detergents have been copying 
 political advertisers, for ages.  This should not be surprising.  Persuasive 
 communication is the essence of politics, and has been since the dawn of time.  
 The marketing of branded consumer goods is a relative newcomer to the 
 scene.’[25] 
 
Neither is political marketing in this country a product of American importation: 
witness the Conservatives’ decision to hire Guinness advertisers’ S.H. Benson 
during the inter-war years.  Similarly the highly original analysis of Labour 
strategists like Sidney Webb, specifically his insights into political market 
segmentation and targeting, help revise the notion that study of electoral 
organisation has little to offer the greater understanding of how marketing ideas 
and practices have emerged. 
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ABSTRACT. 
By utilising a standard evolutionary model of marketing it is possible to map out 
three key stages in the development of electioneering, each of which is directly 
comparable with the production, sales and marketing orientations in commerce.  
In politics the respective phases can be labelled the propaganda, media and 
marketing approaches to the electorate.  Using this framework the differences 
between the three campaign orientations become self-evident.  Interestingly it also 
becomes possible to trace the similarities in approach, specifically the important if 
previously largely unrecognised role that basic marketing concepts have played in 
British elections since the beginning of the century.  Contrary to popular 
perception, professional advertising and image consciousness are not legacies of 
the 1980s but date back to the decade following the introduction of near universal 
suffrage in 1918.  The realisation of popular television and consumer marketing in 
the 1950s exacerbated the need for more coherent party image management.  
Finally in the late 1970s and 1980s both main contenders for government 
underwent strategic changes akin to embracing a marketing orientation. 
 19
The Historical Role of Marketing in British 
Politics 
 
 
Dominic Wring 
Nottingham Trent University 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction: increasingly popular reference 
to role of ‘marketing’ in politics 
 
 
 
2.  Evolutionary Models of Marketing:  
Crompton & Lamb(1986) divide marketing into 
theory and practice- 
 
‘Marketing is about two things.  First it is a 
philosophy, an attitude and a persepctive.  
Second, it is a set of activities used to implement 
that philosophy.’ 
 
*So it is possible to view development of 
electioneering with reference to changes in 
strategic orientation adopted, not just the media 
and technologies used. 
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3.  Era of Mass Propaganda. 
Parallel with production orientation in 
commerce- strategy essentially one-directional 
communication: 
 
‘... increased awareness would increase voter 
preference.  The inputs to the promotion 
campaign to achieve increased awareness were 
designed on the basis of guess and 
intuition.’(Shama, 1976) 
 
 
*Marketing awareness- 1918 and rise of mass 
media/society/electorate.  Conservative(1920s 
handbook); Labour(Egerton Wake; Sidney 
Webb) 
 
*Press offices- Conservative, 1911; Labour, 
1917 
 
*Professional advertising- Conservative, 1929; 
Labour(London) 1937 
 
*Film production- Conservatives/Clavering and 
Korda; Labour and Paul Rotha. 
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4.  The Introduction of Media Campaigning. 
Similar to the ‘selling concept’ in business 
strategy: 
 
‘(polling) studies were conducted concerning the 
effectiveness of different promotion appeals and 
media in reaching voters’(Shama). 
 
*Introduction of party opinion polling 
-Conservative PORD, 1948(‘The Floating 
Vote’,1949); Labour ‘Must Labour Lose?’, 1960. 
 
*Intensification of advertising/rise of admass 
culture 
-Conservatives and CPV, 1948-66;  Labour 
PEBs, 1959 and ‘Let’s Go with Labour’, 1964. 
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5.  The Advent of Political Marketing. 
Mirrors the development of marketing 
orientation in business strategy sense.  The 
approach: 
 
‘calls for research which goes far deeper than 
this(i.e. copy testing).  The new marketing 
concept is interested in the basic needs and 
wants of the voters.’(Shama) 
 
 
*Full service polling and advertising consultancy 
-Conservatives and Saatchi brothers, 1978-; 
Labour and the Shadow Agency, 1986- 
 
*Marketing research/environmental analysis and 
leadership development of Margaret Thatcher 
and Neil Kinnock. 
 
 
 
6.  Conclusions. 
‘Americanisation’ thesis limited- British parties 
making major strategic headway in inter-war 
period. 
 
